SOUTH AFRICA AND THE DRC: EVALUATING A SOUTH–SOUTH PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

NEISSAN ALESSANDRO BESHARATI
CARMEL RAWHANI
SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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MANAGER Aditi Lalbahadur, aditi.Lalbahadur@wits.ac.za
**ABSTRACT**

The ‘Rise of the South’* and the role of ‘emerging powers’ in global development has animated much of the political and economic discourse of the past decade. There is, however, little empirical evidence on the contribution that emerging Southern partners make to sustainable development, due to the lack of common measurement systems for South–South cooperation (SSC). The following case study utilises the analytical framework developed by the Network of Southern Think Tanks (NeST) to assess the range, extent and quality of South Africa’s peace, governance and economic support to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The study reveals that South Africa, in absolute financial terms, is a significant development partner in the DRC, and even exceeds the traditional donors when its aid is measured in proportion to gross national income. The qualitative field research highlights that South Africa’s approach to development co-operation to a large extent reflects the core values of SSC, although with a mixed bag of successes and failures in terms of the results of co-operation activities. This pilot study of the South Africa–DRC development partnership is one of the first in which the NeST conceptual and methodological framework has been tested for the purpose of further refining tools and indicators for SSC analysis, so as to assist the future monitoring and evaluation endeavours of South Africa and other emerging development partners.


**ABOUT THE AUTHORS**

Neissan Alessandro Besharati is a project manager at SAIIA and a research associate at several prominent development think tanks. He is an honorary research fellow and a part-time lecturer at the Wits School of Governance, as well as a senior monitoring and evaluation technical specialist at the African Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results.

Carmel Rawhani is a research assistant at SAIIA in the Development Effectiveness Programme. Her previous experience lies with the UN, the non-governmental sector and the EU.

For enquiries, comments and follow-up on the contents of this paper contact neissan.besharati@wits.ac.za / carmel.rawhani@wits.ac.za
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DISCLAIMER

The analysis provided in this paper represents the views of the authors gathered through interactions with various stakeholders, thus should not be attributed to any particular government, organisation or project funder. The usual caveats apply.
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ARF  African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund
BAPA  Buenos Aires Plan of Action
BNC  binational commission
COGTA  Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs
DAC  Development Assistance Committee
DBSA  Development Bank of Southern Africa
DFA  Department of Foreign Affairs
DHA  Department of Home Affairs
DIRCO  Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DoD  Department of Defence
DPME  Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation
DPSA  Department of Public Service and Administration
dti  Department of Trade and Industry
DRC  Democratic Republic of the Congo
ENA  Ecole Nationale d'Administration
GDP  gross domestic product
GIZ  Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GNI  gross national income
IDASA  Institute for Democracy in Africa
IDC  Industrial Development Corporation
IEC  Independent Electoral Commission
M&E  monitoring and evaluation
MDG  Millennium Development Goal
MoU  Memorandum of Understanding
MONUSCO  Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo
NeST  Network of Southern Think Tanks
NGO  non-governmental organisation
NSC  North–South cooperation
NYU–CIC  New York University Center on International Cooperation
ODA  official development assistance
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PALAMA  Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy
PCD  policy coherence for development
PCRD  post-conflict reconstruction and development
SADPA  South African Development Partnership Agency
SACU  Southern African Customs Union
SAMDI  South African Management Development Institute
SAPS  South African Police Service
SDG  Sustainable Development Goal
SSC  South–South cooperation
TOSSD  Total Official Support for Sustainable Development
INTRODUCTION

The year 2015 ushered in a new era of international development with the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) continue the previous poverty alleviation efforts of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), still largely unfulfilled in Africa, and integrate new dimensions such as equitable growth, employment, infrastructure development and environmental sustainability. SDG 16 also emphasises the central role that peace and security, good governance and rule of law, and inclusive and accountable institutions play in fostering development objectives. This is echoed in the AU's Agenda 2063.1

The global development architecture is evolving, with new players, approaches, financing instruments and modalities. Largely as a reflection of the rise of so-called ‘emerging economies’, the development landscape now includes actors from the developing South that have made significant progress domestically and are playing an important role in the development of other countries in their region. The third Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa in 2015 thus re-affirmed that ‘South–South cooperation [SSC] is an important element of international cooperation for development’.2

South Africa is considered one of these emerging partners. In line with Africa's priorities articulated in the AU’s Agenda 2063, South Africa’s key focus in its international co-operation has been on peace and security, institution building, infrastructure development and regional integration.3 The country has never considered itself a donor but rather a development partner working with its fellow African states to promote continental development in a spirit of ubuntu.4

While South Africa has been involved in a number of countries across Africa, it is in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) that many efforts of different South African ministries, government agencies and parastatals have been concentrated since the late 1990s. In addition to these state-led endeavours, although not necessarily motivated by the same strategy, a number of South African companies and civil society organisations are also active in the DRC. Evidence emerging from this research suggests that the DRC is the biggest recipient of South Africa’s development assistance, if one excludes the Southern

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3 AU, 2014, op. cit.
African Customs Union (SACU) transfers. Thus the development partnership between South Africa and the DRC presents an excellent case study to analyse SSC in the African context.

The case study will be evaluated through an analytical framework developed by the Network of Southern Think Tanks (NeST), a group of research institutions from developing countries dedicated to systematising and generating knowledge on SSC. The framework, developed through various expert group meetings in 2015, unpacks and operationalises conceptual issues that assist in the measurement and accounting of SSC. It provides a set of 20 indicators, organised in six dimensions, to assess the quality of South–South partnerships. It is against these parameters that the South Africa–DRC development partnership will be qualitatively assessed.

This paper therefore has a two-fold purpose. Firstly, it hopes to make a contribution to the current global debates on appropriate monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems for SSC. It is one of the first pilots in which this NeST analytical framework has been field-tested. Lessons learnt from this case study will allow for the refinement and improvement of the instrument before it is applied in the evaluation of the development co-operation efforts of other Southern actors.

Secondly, the study will produce new evidence on South Africa as an emerging development partner and on its role in post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) in Africa, particularly within the fragile state context of the DRC. It is hoped that lessons learnt from the South Africa–DRC co-operation experience in the field of peace, governance and development will feed into the operationalisation of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) once it is launched, while providing policymakers with greater insights on South Africa’s role in the global and regional development architecture.

**CHALLENGES OF MEASURING SOUTH–SOUTH COOPERATION**

SSC has its roots in the solidarity politics of the Bandung Conference of 1955, and was formalised within the UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1964. Over the years it has evolved organically across a number of important international conferences,
notably those in Buenos Aires (1978), Nairobi (2009), Bogota (2010) and Delhi (2013 and 2016). SSC has grown in size and importance as emerging economies have become more successful. Thus SSC has been recognised as an important feature in achieving the 17 SDGs and other regional development processes.

Extensive literature already exists on the topic of SSC. SSC initiatives are so diverse that creating a clear-cut category of SSC modalities is a delicate and complex task. To attempt to measure SSC it is necessary to define it. But reaching a consensus on a common conceptual understanding is a politically and technically challenging process.

The traditional Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) definition of development assistance refers to:

Grants or Loans to countries and territories of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) which are:

(a) undertaken by the official sector;
(b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective;
(c) at concessional financial terms [a loan should have a Grant Element of at least 25%].

In recent years the concessionality terms of official development assistance (ODA) have been revised. The fragile global security climate has spurred attempts to extend the definition to include certain types of military expenditure and refugee support costs. Parallel to the endeavours to restructure ODA, the DAC has also started to propose new metrics such as Country Programmable Aid (CPA) and Total Official Support to Sustainable Development (TOSSD), to assist in tracking the diversity of new financing mechanisms for the 2030 agenda.

While eschewing the constraints of the ODA definition, Southern providers have struggled to define SSC and what should be included or excluded therefrom. In the 1978 Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA), SSC was focused almost entirely on technical co-operation.

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among developing countries. But in 2003 the UN General Assembly decided to combine the BAPA definition with economic co-operation among developing countries into the consolidated concept of SSC. Therefore, much of SSC today occurs through a mix of public and private channels, where the lines between aid, trade and investment are often blurred. The variety of lending instruments and credit lines also brings into question developmental versus commercial intent and the degree of concessionality of these various forms of financing. The inclusion of special tariff arrangements, security expenditures, debt restructuring and student and refugee costs is still widely debated in the various conceptions of both SSC and North–South cooperation (NSC).

As much of SSC consists of technical co-operation, knowledge transfer and in-kind contributions, which are difficult to monetise, Southern partners have avoided quantification exercises. These would provide unfair comparisons with Northern donors, where the financial value of goods, salaries and services are higher than in middle and low-income economies (where currency, purchasing power and cost of living are lower).

While some SSC providers posit that the diversity of approaches means that there can be no commonly-agreed definition of SSC,14 other developing countries argue that a clear conception of SSC needs to emerge for the purpose of internal and external accountability15 and to allow for better analysis and comparison of SSC between countries.16 A commonly-agreed definition (one that is sensitive to nuances) and appropriate frameworks for the M&E of SSC are urgently needed.17

Agreeing on a common definition for consistent reporting of SSC remains the most complex and politically sensitive issue. Methods to evaluate the impact of SSC are not drastically different from methods to evaluate the impact of NSC. However, due to its process- and relationship-oriented nature, SSC is easier assessed through qualitative methods and the classical case-study approach.18 In their various discussions NeST members have also concluded that while SSC is an important area of exploration, impact assessments of SSC are premature when SSC still struggles with basic data management, regular monitoring and consistent reporting.19

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14 Chaturvedi S, op. cit.
19 NeST, 2015a, op. cit.
While discussions around the definition and quantification of SSC remain open, significant progress has been made in measuring the quality of South–South relations and processes. In September 2015 a technical working group of NeST experts gathered in Johannesburg to operationalise the SSC principles agreed on at the various historical Southern conferences into a set of indicators that would assist researchers and practitioners to assess the quality of South–South development partnerships.  

In an effort to avoid rigid and prescriptive models, this framework provides a flexible guide for empirical research that can be adapted to different contexts and used across a variety of country and regional case studies. This paper is based on one of the first field tests of the framework.

**THE SOUTH AFRICA–DRC CASE STUDY**

As a relatively stable African upper middle-income country, South Africa is an important provider of SSC. The most important developmental contribution that South Africa makes is the prominent role it plays in promoting peace, good governance, economic growth and social progress in Africa. However, it lacks a comprehensive M&E system that measures the extent, quality and impact of its outgoing development assistance, to generate the required evidence on its SSC. Without such information, South African policymakers cannot properly account to their domestic stakeholders for their external development spending. They also cannot leverage effectively Pretoria’s soft power in Africa or in global policy forums.

Many South African academics and practitioners assume that the largest development co-operation programme that South Africa undertakes worldwide is in the DRC. The DRC thus provides a useful testing ground for the analytical framework developed in NeST, and an opportunity to pilot definitions, methods and indicators in the analysis of the South Africa–DRC development partnership.

**STUDY DESIGN, METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

Like its counterparts in the global South, Pretoria defines its development co-operation quite broadly to include a wide set of activities that promote regional development. Under the old ODA definition some of South Africa’s defence and security expenditures in the DRC might have been excluded from the accounting of its developmental co-operation. However, from an African point of view a peaceful DRC is an essential precondition for a stable and prosperous Great Lakes region.

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The activities of South Africa in the DRC are both official and private, bilateral and plurilateral, financial and technical in nature, and involve a range of actors, such as the government, parastatals, civil society and business. The conceptual framework for SSC that will be used in this paper reflects two definitions offered by the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), which has described SSC as:

- co-operation amongst countries and/or groupings in the global South aimed at addressing and developing a common stance on political, economic, social and human rights issues (all of which are often termed developmental issues, or issues which must be addressed in order to overcome the historical legacy of marginalization faced by these countries.

And,

- co-operation between countries in the field of aid, trade, security and politics to promote economic and social well-being in developing countries.

Most of the partnership activities described in the next section, including the peace and security, governance, logistics and capacity development activities, are aimed at promoting long-term stability and development in the DRC and the region. Therefore these activities are generally acceptable even in the current updated ODA definition of the DAC.

However, categorising the economic co-operation between South Africa and the DRC becomes more problematic. The billions of rands (often quoted by Pretoria) in investment and trade between South Africa and the DRC (which certainly may have important developmental benefits) should rather be kept separate from reports on South Africa’s official development assistance, except where South African public financing is involved. Although it would be desirable to have more information on development financing stemming from South Africa’s private sector, it would be too difficult to capture all such flows, as this exercise is challenging even for OECD countries. The paper therefore

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will focus on quantifying simply the ‘official’ South–South development co-operation that is initiated by public institutions. A forthcoming SAIIA briefing discusses South African private investments (including corporate social investments) in the DRC.

The developmental loans provided by South African parastatals such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) had previously not been able to meet the DAC standards of concessionality to be classified as ODA. These institutions, in fact, while offering more flexible terms than commercial banks, do not offer better rates and more ‘grant element’ than their competitors among the bigger international financial institutions, the European development banks (such as the European Investment Bank, Agence Française de Développement and the KFW) or the Asian EXIM banks (India and China). Although the South African development finance institutions operate in a semi-commercial manner and raise their funds in capital markets, they are still state-owned enterprises reporting to government ministries (such as the National Treasury and Department for Economic Development) and are thus aligned to South Africa’s domestic and foreign policies. These institutions are instrumental in promoting regional integration and building much-needed infrastructure for economic growth. The activities of the DBSA and IDC often pave the way for greater regional trade, private investment (which ultimately promotes employment), small and medium enterprise development, and local revenue generation.

As such consensus was reached within the NeST South Africa chapter that development loans provided by the IDC and DBSA could also be counted as part of South Africa’s development co-operation on the continent.

Based on the above conceptual framework, the case study collected both qualitative and quantitative information on the co-operative activities between South Africa and the DRC. The paper maps out their relationship and asks: How useful are the NeST indicators for measuring SSC? What is an appropriate definition of SSC that captures all the elements of South Africa’s co-operation? What are the key features of South Africa’s approach to development in Africa? Does it operate differently from traditional donors? As an African partner, is it any more effective than its Northern and Eastern counterparts? What lessons have been learnt? And what are the implications and subsequent recommendations for SADPA?

As SSC is mostly based on relationships and collaborative processes between developing countries, interviews with key stakeholders were chosen as one of the most appropriate data collection methods for this case study. The approach was expanded to include observation and focus group discussions. In all instances efforts were made to triangulate

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26 Some scholars prefer to use the term ‘South–South development cooperation’; others such as DIRCO (see footnote 25) consider all SSC activities to be ‘developmental’. This paper will thus continue to refer to SSC as general co-operation between Southern countries for the purpose of development. See further discussion in NeST, 2015a, op. cit.
29 This was also based on a proposal put forward by a DBSA official at the Institute for Global Dialogue seminar on ‘South Africa’s Development Diplomacy’, Cape Town, February 2016.
the data through documentary review and interviews with diverse stakeholders. Wherever possible, documentary analysis was conducted on project proposals, strategic documents, organisational reports, memoranda of understanding (MoUs), official communiqués and correspondence between institutions, which provided the basis for some of the figures related to the various joint development projects. Unfortunately, in most cases documentation was very scarce or not made publicly available. The paper is therefore primarily based on qualitative fieldwork carried out in the DRC and South Africa in 2015 and 2016.

**South Africa’s partnership with the DRC: An overview**

Having gained its independence in 1960, the DRC (‘Zaire’ for most of its post-colonial history) has been plagued by a political economy of conflict that has had a markedly negative impact on its 78 million people. Situated in the heart of Africa, the DRC’s successive conflicts have affected not only the country and its immediate neighbours but also the rest of the continent. South Africa’s engagement in the DRC (at least post-apartheid, which is the focus of this paper) begins in 1996, in the dying days of Mobutu Sese Seko’s presidency, which was being endangered by an insurgency in the east led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the current president’s father.

South Africa, initially under president Nelson Mandela and then under president Thabo Mbeki, played a central role in bringing the DRC into SADC in 1997 and later facilitating the SADC-led political mediation processes in the conflict-affected region. Following the outbreak of the second Congo War and the assassination of Laurent Kabila, Mbeki hosted 300 representatives of the Congolese militia, political parties, government and civil society in peace talks at the Sun City casino resort (and later in Pretoria) for several months. This led to the resolution of the hostilities and transitional power-sharing arrangements that would pave the way for the first democratic elections since the 1960s, in 2006.

After this political mediation South Africa’s involvement has extended to the broader objective of peacebuilding. South Africa was one of the first African states to deploy peacekeepers in 1999, in 2001 and in 2003 when it undertook an emergency deployment under Operation Mistral to the Mission de Nations Unies au Congo (MONUC). Since the UN Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) was established in 2010, South Africa has been the largest African contributor to the multilateral peacekeeping operation. Over the years South African troops deployed in the DRC have numbered between 1 200 and 1 500, including infantry battalions and aviation regiments. In 2016 the South African military command took over the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC from the Brazilians. South African, Malawian and Tanzanian troops also comprise the Force Intervention Brigade, a special African peacekeeping unit within MONUSCO and

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31 In terms of hardware, South Africa contributed an aircraft, three Apache helicopters, unmanned ARV (aerial reconnaissance vehicle) ground vehicles, engineers and mobile hospitals.
among the first UN-mandated offensive missions (Chapter VII of the UN Charter) aimed at fighting rebel groups in the east of the country.

South Africa played a crucial support role in the 2006 and 2011 elections in the DRC through its own Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which worked closely with the DRC’s Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante. The IEC’s assistance included training electoral personnel, providing technical assistance before, during and after the elections, monitoring the elections and providing communications equipment and information and communications technology experts. Pretoria’s most noteworthy assistance was printing the ballots and providing logistical support (airplanes, helicopters, trucks) for the distribution of 1,863 tonnes of electoral material to remote corners of the country that had little functional road infrastructure.

After providing additional security support to the 2006 elections, the South African Police Service (SAPS) implemented a capacity-building programme for the Congolese police through specialised training and the provision of technical equipment. The SAPS programme was implemented in collaboration with the Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA), which also curated the civic engagement of the South Africa–DRC security sector reform programme. In addition to this the South African Department of Defence (DoD) provided bilateral support through strategy development, continuous knowledge exchange and the training of three Congolese battalions involved in peacekeeping operations in the east of the country.

In many ways, South Africa’s support for the Congolese transition was a ‘whole-of-government’ process of state building and PCRD. Under the rubric of public sector reform, a range of South African departments assisted their Congolese counterparts to strengthen crucial state institutions. The Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) assisted the DRC with its organic law and legislative framework for decentralised governance. The Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) assisted Fonction Publique to roll out a massive civil servant census throughout the 11 provinces to identify the numerous ‘ghost workers’ and establish biometric identity cards and a clear pay-roll and pension system for retired public servants. The DPSA also provided the DRC with technical assistance on its anti-corruption legislation. The South African Management Development Institute (SAMDI) 33 assisted in the establishment of the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA). Together they trained the first batch of Congolese civil servants post-elections. Many other South African departments (discussed later in the paper) have been involved in various capacity-building activities in the DRC. This has even included exchanges between South African and Congolese provincial governments. 34

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33 Later renamed the Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA) and subsequently the National School of Government (NSG).

A functioning economy is crucial for state building, and while South Africa’s engagement in the early years was focused more on post-conflict reconstruction, in recent years economic development has received more attention. Through the Spatial Development Initiative, the Department of Trade and Industry (dti) has provided support for feasibility
studies for the industrial development of the Bas Congo corridor, which links Kinshasa to the western ports of Boma and Banana. The IDC and the DBSA have provided financing for many infrastructure projects, particularly in Katanga province, which has long-held mining links with South Africa. The DBSA has also supported the restructuring of the Kasumbalesa (DRC–Zambia) border post to free up congestion at an important trade junction of goods in and out of the DRC. The infrastructure and economic development initiatives of these state-owned enterprises, as well as the dti’s annual Investment and Trade Initiative held since 2009, have further promoted the South African private sector’s engagement in the DRC by increasing trade and investment opportunities between the two countries.  

South Africa is the DRC’s biggest supplier of foreign goods and services, providing over 30% of the country’s total imports.  

**FIGURE 2**  

![Graph showing trade between South Africa and the DRC from 2006 to 2015.](image)


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35 For more details see Besharati NA & G Mthembu-Salter (forthcoming), *op. cit.*

The key, and more recent area of strategic engagement between the two countries has been the energy sector, specifically the Grand Inga hydroelectric power plants. In October 2013 South Africa and the DRC signed the Grand Inga Treaty, which committed South Africa to off-take 2 500MW of the initial 4 800MW that will be produced in phase 3 of the Inga initiative. This will involve South African utility company Eskom committing to build high-voltage transmission lines from the Inga site all the way to South Africa.37 The Inga 3 project has, however, suffered from a number of political and technical setbacks and delays38 that do not foresee the new power station producing electricity before 2020. While South Africa does not have the capacity to compete with some of the other big international players interested in financing the $14 billion mega-project, it may still play an indirect financing role if the New Development Bank decides to contribute to this major hydroelectric project.

South Africa and the DRC operate under the umbrella of about 36 MoUs. These partnership agreements outline a range of collaborative plans, of which a large number are still to be funded and implemented. The South African embassy in Kinshasa is known as the ‘super embassy’39 with a relatively large staff complement, including an influential ambassador and a number of military, police, home affairs, trade and other attachés. The DRC is one of the few countries with which South Africa holds a yearly binational commission (BNC) at the heads of state level, along with regular technical review meetings on the various co-operation activities.

ACCOUNTING SOUTH AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT TO THE DRC

Nobody in South Africa or in the DRC, whether in the government or in academia, is able to provide an accurate and comprehensive account of development flows between the two countries. The reason lies largely in the absence of a holistic monitoring and reporting system and a clear working definition of SSC. The following section is based on a SAIIA quantitative survey of the financial reports of some of the key South African agencies and departments that have been central to the South Africa–DRC co-operation processes. In the course of reviewing budgetary information we ensured that such expenditures fitted into the DIRCO definition of SSC provided at the outset of this paper.

The most obvious source of bilateral aid from South Africa is the grants awarded by the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF), a special funding instrument jointly managed by the National Treasury and DIRCO. The ARF, however, is not the only tool Pretoria uses to conduct its development co-operation. Aside from the various plurilateral financing mechanisms (the India–Brazil–South Africa Trust Fund, 37 Based on interviews with South African and Congolese energy sector officials, October to December 2015.
39 Referenced by various South African public and private sector officials engaged in activities in the DRC.
contributions to UN agencies, multilateral development banks, regional institutions and arrangements) managed by DIRCO and the National Treasury, many other South African line ministries and public institutions have provided direct bilateral support to their Congolese counterparts by using their own operational budgets. The research team thus conducted its survey by first examining the annual budgets of the departments and institutions mentioned in the case study (i.e., DIRCO, DoD, IEC, DPSA, COGTA, SAMDI, Department of Home Affairs [DHA], SAPS, dti, DBSA, IDC, Eskom and the South African Reserve Bank). Subsequently it reviewed the budgets of other ministries potentially involved in the DRC, such as the South African Revenue Service and the departments of Minerals, Energy, Agriculture, and Environment and Tourism. Similar to the approach of DAC donors and other SSC partners (such as Brazil, India, China and Mexico), the quantitative analysis of South Africa’s financial aid also included the ‘imputed student costs’ and scholarships provided by the South African Department of Higher Education and Training and its sub-agencies to Congolese students and officials trained by South African universities. The results of the exercise are collated into various tables in Appendix 1.

A key finding of the analysis is that South Africa’s development co-operation projects in the DRC are often financed by a combination of line ministry internal budgets, ARF grants and third-party donor funding. For example, a large part of the SAPS and IDASA security sector reform project was financed by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID). USAID provided funding for SAMDI, and Sweden and Germany complemented the ARF funding for the public service census implemented by the DPSA. Many of the South Africa–DRC development projects are actually trilateral co-operation initiatives, which have included other traditional partners such as the UN Development Programme, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the Netherlands, in addition to the ones already mentioned. In other instances South African assistance was funded from either the MONUSCO peacekeeping budget or even by the DRC government itself, when for instance electoral material was procured from South African printing companies. South Africa’s contributions are less financial and more technical, as it shares its knowledge, technology and expertise through in-kind contributions of South African experts, equipment and material. For such practical reasons (but also for political ones) South Africa prefers to be considered an ‘implementing partner’ for development efforts in the DRC rather than a ‘donor’ in the traditional sense.

40 As the DRC is not a member of the SACU arrangement these transfers have been excluded for the SSC calculations in this case study.
41 On 8 September 1997 a Protocol on Education and Training was signed by SADC leaders in Blantyre that committed member states to treat students from other SADC countries the same as home students for the purpose of fees and accommodation costs, within 10 years. By 2008, therefore, all Congolese students studying in South African universities received the same Department of Higher Education and Training subsidy as South African students.
As stated earlier, to comprehensively quantify the South Africa–DRC development partnerships is an arduous task. Departmental reports do not necessarily have a specific budget item for international development activities, making it difficult to compile a full and accurate picture. In many cases projects were difficult to quantify because of the way expenditures were captured – some organisations simply summarised a number of their SSC activities in different countries and provided a lump sum for overall international expenditure without a specific breakdown by country. It was also difficult to trace South Africa’s contributions to the DRC via multilateral channels (UN, AU, New Partnership for Africa’s Development, SADC, African Development Bank, World Bank). The research team also endeavoured to monetise the political and technical co-operation and knowledge sharing of South Africa with the DRC; however, this was not possible as many inputs provided by South Africa, such as staff time for political mediation, technical assistance, and travel and mission costs, were easily lost in other more general business budget lines of the various institutions providing support to their Congolese counterparts. And finally, while aware of the activities of some government agencies, such as the initiatives of the dti, the researchers were not able to access the relevant financial data during the short timeframe of the study.

For the sake of clarity and accuracy, this documentary survey has kept development projects in the DRC funded bilaterally through South African public resources (originating from the national fiscus and South African taxpayers) separate from the money that South Africa has mobilised from third-party sources to support development activities in the DRC. Appendix 1 distinguishes between these two development financing streams. It also shows that bilateral development co-operation with the DRC has been significantly larger than the funding mobilised through trilateral co-operation activities with Northern donors. The financial reports of international development spending by South African departments is based on audited figures of disbursements, as opposed to amounts committed, as is often the case in aid reports by DAC donors.

In the accounting exercise undertaken by the SAIIA research team, the case study revealed that between 2001 and 2015 South Africa spent at least ZAR 8.5 billion (over $1 billion) on DRC-related SSC through various government departments and public entities. South African development flows to the DRC appear to have fluctuated over the years (Figure 2) due, in part, to the limited published information on all South African development co-operation activities. In its peak year of 2008, Pretoria’s development co-operation was found to be nearly ZAR 1.5 billion (approximately $181 million), making it the third biggest development partner in absolute terms

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44 Chiwandamira D & M Smit, op. cit.
45 Currency code for the South African rand.
(Figure 3). It surpassed the DRC’s former colonial master, Belgium, and almost equalled DFID’s development assistance to the DRC in that same year. In relation to its economic capacity (aid in proportion to gross national income [GNI]), South Africa surpasses most of the OECD-DAC donors in its international development efforts (Figure 3), corroborating the accounts of previous scholars on the topic.\(^48\)

**FIGURE 3 VOLUMES OF SOUTH AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE DRC, 2001–2015, ZAR MILLIONS**

Source: Based on figures provided in financial reports of SA government departments listed in full in Tables A1–A3 in Appendix 1

FIGURE 4  TOP 10 DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROVIDERS TO THE DRC IN 2008, $ MILLIONS


FIGURE 5  TOP 10 DONORS TO THE DRC IN 2008, BASED ON DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNI (ATLAS METHOD)

Source: Authors’ compilation; OECD, ibid; AidFlows, ibid
This quantitative analysis performed by SAIIA highlighted that there is little to no co-ordination of South Africa’s outgoing development co-operation activities, and that the M&E systems and financial reporting of Pretoria’s SSC remain extremely weak. The above exercise also provided a simple model of how SSC can be conceptually understood and accounted for in the context of South Africa’s development co-operation, thus providing a proposal for a working definition to the global SSC debates and discussions around ODA reform and TOSSD.

**Qualitative analysis of the South Africa–DRC partnership**

Many actors in the South argue that development co-operation between Southern partners leads to more horizontal, equitable, mutually beneficial, empowering, efficient, locally appropriate and demand-driven development assistance. The South Africa–DRC case study provides an opportunity to test some of these assumptions by examining the quality of South Africa’s co-operation with the DRC and whether the political rhetoric matches the reality on the ground.

The SAIIA research team used the analytical framework developed by NeST during the course of the 2015 technical working group meetings. As the focus of the analysis was the bilateral relationship between South Africa and the DRC, the indicators under dimension 7 (SSC in the global arena) were integrated in other dimensions (horizontality & equality; accountability & transparency; and development effectiveness). The result was a slightly modified NeST qualitative framework that identifies 20 indicators, grouped under six SSC dimensions. These are illustrated in Table 1.

In the next section each of these six dimensions and 20 indicators will be analysed in the context of the South Africa–DRC development partnership. Before discussing how the co-operation between South Africa and the DRC performs against the above SSC principles, a brief summary of the indicators is provided under each dimension.

As SSC is heavily based on relations and collaborative processes, the research team found it more appropriate and easier to use qualitative data collection methods such as researcher observations, interviews and group discussions. The following analysis is based therefore on the inputs provided by different government officials, diplomats, development practitioners, legislators, civil society organisations, the academia, media, private sector, state-owned enterprises and experts from both South Africa and the DRC, as well as extensive fieldwork conducted in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town, Kinshasa, Lekasi, Goma and Lubumbashi.

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One cannot escape acknowledging the subjective nature of this exercise; nonetheless the research project endeavoured to be as comprehensive as possible and ensured triangulation of information by gathering perspectives from both sides (South African and Congolese) as well as different actors engaged with or observing the South–South development partnership between South Africa and the DRC.

### TABLE 1 NeST INDICATORS TO ASSESS QUALITY OF SSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National ownership</th>
<th>Accountability &amp; transparency</th>
<th>Horizontality &amp; equality</th>
<th>Inclusive participation</th>
<th>Development effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Demand-driven co-operation</td>
<td>11 Data management &amp; M&amp;E systems</td>
<td>4 Mutual benefit</td>
<td>14 Platforms for multi-stakeholder dialogue</td>
<td>17 Flexibility &amp; adaptation to local context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Alignment to national priorities</td>
<td>12 Publishing &amp; open access to information</td>
<td>5 Shared decisions and resources</td>
<td>15 Active engagement in programme cycle</td>
<td>18 Time &amp; cost efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Non-conditionality/respect for sovereignty</td>
<td>13 Mutual accountability &amp; joint reviews</td>
<td>6 Reciprocity, trust &amp; international alliances</td>
<td>16 Protection of people &amp; environment</td>
<td>19 Co-ordination &amp; complementarity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**National ownership**

This dimension focuses on the sustained leadership on the part of the recipient country in setting priorities, directing policy and shaping co-operation processes. This is based on the expectation that SSC needs to be demand-driven (indicator 1), involving projects that are based on requests from the recipient country and in which the recipient is not only a stakeholder but also in the driving seat of the development initiatives. SSC is thus expected to be aligned to national priorities (indicator 2) and be in line with the recipient country’s stated results-based development strategy. The principle of national ownership incorporates the idea that SSC should be non-conditional, in that it respects national sovereignty (indicator 3) and that projects agreed between both countries should be free of implied or tacit conditionalities.50

50 NeST, 2015a, *op. cit.*
While the DRC government has developed a number of national development plans and growth and poverty reduction strategies in the post-2006 era, as per the requirements of the IMF, World Bank and OECD donors, the development assistance provided by South Africa has been less explicitly (though not intentionally) aligned to these donor frameworks. Nonetheless, South Africa’s activities in the DRC have been conducted on a completely demand-driven basis. An important clue to this effect is the fact that development projects and co-operation activities between ministries would often come about after presidential visits or ministerial meetings between the two countries. In its fieldwork, the SAIIA research team was privy to some of the formal correspondence and internal co-operation agreements between South African and Congolese institutions, which further confirmed the demand-driven nature of the development support provided by South Africa.

The government of the DRC has been in the driving seat of its national developmental activities, and South Africa has been referred to as a ‘passive partner responding often in an ad hoc manner to the various requests coming from Kinshasa’. As a result, while Pretoria’s co-operation has been generally aligned to national Congolese priorities (defined by the ruling elite) it has been internally fragmented on the South African foreign policy side and its overall development co-operation strategy. While different South African agencies have diligently provided demand-driven assistance to their Congolese counterparts, this has resulted in South Africa’s development co-operation lacking overall co-ordination, coherence and strategic direction.

South Africa has also followed the Southern principles of non-conditionality, non-interference and respect for sovereignty, often to the point of contradicting its own constitutional values. Contrary to countries such as the US, which has issued clear statements that it will not support President Joseph Kabila’s bid for a third term, South Africa has not made any direct public remarks on Kabila’s attempts to change

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52 Comments from numerous South African officials engaged in co-operation activities with the DRC.

53 Discussed at greater length in Besharati NA, 2013b, op. cit.

the constitution to prolong his presidential term. South Africa thus faces a number of dilemmas – trying to reconcile its need to maintain good relations with a strategic partner with maintaining political stability in the region, while promoting its ideals of constitutionalism and human rights.

**Horizontality and equality**

Based on the mutually beneficial nature of SSC, this dimension implies relationships that are more horizontal, viewing countries as equal partners rather than as donors and recipients. The understanding that SSC is for mutual benefit (indicator 4) is evidenced by SSC agreements that explicitly state the benefits and gains that will accrue to each partner in the context of these partnerships. Shared decision-making and shared resources (indicator 5) are also an important contributor to horizontality, and are evidenced by good joint management apparatus, as well as the ratio of human and financial resources invested by each partner in SSC. The foundation of this dimension lies in ‘reciprocal trust’ (indicator 6), which is assessed in a proxy manner by the frequency and quality of communication between the two countries, the length of the bilateral partnership and the collaboration in multilateral spaces.

In the various field interviews, representatives of the South African and DRC governments repeatedly claimed to have a true partnership among equals. In reality, while there are clear gains for the DRC in the South African development activities, the degree to which South Africa benefits from the co-operation is questionable. A number of officials involved in areas from public sector reform to infrastructure development have commented that, contrary to most other development partners operating in the DRC [the Bretton Woods institutions, and European and Asian donors], South Africa often comes unprepared to the table, lacking a clear strategic focus of what it wants to gain out of the co-operation activities.

South Africa’s motivations remain lofty and idealistic, such as the promotion of a peaceful, stable and prosperous DRC for a better-integrated region. Even in practice the drive behind Pretoria’s development assistance appears to be solidarity and ubuntu, which South African development practitioners and academics often criticise for being a naïve

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55 Although not addressing Kabila specifically, last year at the 25th World Economic Forum plenary session President Jacob Zuma mentioned that the issue of third termism should stop, as it was causing problems in Africa. See Ferreira E, ‘Zuma warns against third term bids’, iol news, 4 June 2015, http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/zuma-warns-against-third-term-bids-1867693, accessed 18 March 2016; Ngemi Y, op. cit.

56 Ferreira E, op. cit.

57 Personal interview.
approach to its foreign policy.\textsuperscript{58} While South African stakeholders have stated that ‘there is a general lack of a South African economic diplomacy strategy and commercial benefits for South African businesses are often an after-thought’,\textsuperscript{59} the main recent strategic driver of Pretoria’s engagement in the DRC has been the energy potential that the Inga dam could provide for South Africa and the region.\textsuperscript{60}

Development cooperation officials engaged in reconstruction efforts in the DRC have commented that,\textsuperscript{61}

> with decades of aid dependency, the DRC has gained experience and mastery in maximising the support it receives from various international donors … South Africa is thus often treated as ‘yet another donor’ that Congolese recipients have learned to use, abuse and financially instrumentalise for their immediate objectives.

The desire of South Africa and the DRC to engage with one another on the basis of equal partnership is reflected in the reciprocal engagements of political and technical personnel in the planning and review processes of their 36 joint development projects. However, at the implementation level, because of its stronger economic capacity South Africa is always expected to contribute most of the financial resources to cover the costs of development co-operation activities with its Congolese counterparts. This occurred, for instance, in the political mediation process and in the PCRD initiatives of the IEC, SAPS, Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA) and DPSA discussed earlier.

Although it does not possess the financial prowess of other donors, Congolese officials have referred to South Africa as a preferred development partner and an honest broker. Because of the history of conflict affecting the region, the Kinshasa government trusts Pretoria more than it does its immediate neighbours.\textsuperscript{62} The political relationship between the South African and Congolese governments goes back many years and has contributed to the strong trust and co-operation that exists between the two countries. As indicated earlier, the biannual co-operation meetings between South Africa and the DRC are not only among the few that engage the heads of state but have also included up to 18 ministers on both sides, as was the case in the first BNC in 2004.

In recent times, as Kabila has become more isolated and is scarcely seen at regional meetings,\textsuperscript{63} the South African president is one of the few external actors who has the ear

\textsuperscript{58} Based on various discussions and interviews with South African foreign policy and development experts in Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape Town in 2015 and 2016.
\textsuperscript{59} Personal interview.
\textsuperscript{60} Maupin A, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{61} Personal interview.
\textsuperscript{62} Since 1998 Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi have played a role in destabilising the Great Lakes region and supporting rebel groups in the eastern part of the DRC. See more in Prunier G, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{63} Various African diplomats report that it has been many years since Kabila has attended an AU or SADC summit in person.
of the Congolese president. The close bilateral relationship between South Africa and the DRC has led the two countries to co-operate closely in multilateral forums such as the UN, G-77, AU, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and SADC and its various sectorial sub-organs (police, energy, agriculture, etc.).

Self-reliance and sustainability

This dimension refers to the principle that SSC should promote reduced external dependency through a steady increase in local capacity. There must be an exit strategy rather than unending aid to the recipient country. As such, capacity building (indicator 7) forms an integral part of SSC and is evidenced both by efforts to build capacity and by noticeable changes as a result of such efforts. Part of this consists of knowledge and technology transfers (indicator 8) in terms of tools and systems that are adopted by partner countries as a result of the SSC activities, as well as the strengthening of national capacities. Untying aid (indicator 9) and using local systems and resources (indicator 10) are central to the capacity development of the recipient country. In principle Southern countries disapprove of tied aid; however, in practice this is often carried out under the pretext of ‘mutual benefit’.64

In line with promoting state building in the DRC, South Africa has invested over ZAR 4.3 billion (over $500 million) between 2001 and 2015 in various capacity development activities and in strengthening Congolese public systems (see Appendix 1). South Africa has also provided its aid untied and has not insisted on the specific use of South African contractors, material or personnel. Nonetheless, much of the equipment and expertise required in the technical co-operation with South Africa (or even other development partners) is more easily and cheaply procured in and mobilised from South Africa.

To encourage self-reliance and sustainability, South African government departments have committed themselves to capacity development and knowledge and technology transfers, particularly in the area of governance and public service. Aside from the extensive work undertaken by PALAMA, other South African capacity-building efforts included DIRCO’s training of over 1 000 Congolese diplomats; the SAPS’s training of the Police Nationale Congolaise; the South African Reserve Bank’s provision of technical assistance to the DRC’s Central Bank; and the DHA’s support to update the DRC’s population registry and provide computerised equipment and training to Congolese customs and immigration officials.

Unfortunately, the impact of these initiatives has been limited due to political instability and the continuous turnover of personnel experienced throughout the Congolese public

64 NeST, 2015a, op. cit.; Besharati NA, 2013a, op. cit.
system.\(^6^5\) South African officials\(^6^6\) also reported that diplomatic training in Pretoria and Kinshasa, which ran from 2005 onwards, was eventually put on hold because the newly trained Congolese diplomats were never deployed to the field.

South Africa is obviously not the only country doing capacity development in the DRC. As a result it is difficult to attribute or isolate the impact produced by South African training from the myriad capacity-building programmes run by other development partners in the country.\(^6^7\)

**Accountability and transparency**

The principles of accountability and transparency\(^6^8\) should also characterise the sharing of information on SSC initiatives. Good data management and M&E systems (indicator 11) are crucial to the realisation of this dimension, so that every phase of the project cycle can be reviewed and evaluated, with evidence that partners use the information to inform decision-making and improve SSC. Publishing and providing open access to SSC information is central to the process (indicator 12); data should be compiled and made accessible to the public, and internal and external stakeholders. Mutual accountability and peer reviews (indicator 13) are also important, as partner countries need to jointly and regularly take stock of their collaborative activities and put in place mechanisms of reciprocal accountability.\(^6^9\)

As we have seen previously, the South African and DRC governments conduct annual joint reviews at both the technical and political level to discuss progress in their collaborative activities, thus encouraging a certain degree of ‘mutual accountability’. The challenge, however, is that officials taking part in the BNC do not have enough evidence and information to inform their discussions.\(^7^0\) This is due in great part to the lack of proper M&E systems on both sides. As seen earlier, there is even a lack of basic documentation on the full range of South Africa’s financial and technical inputs to the DRC. South African diplomats and cooperation officials have explained:\(^7^1\)

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66 Based on several interviews in Kinshasa and Pretoria between October and November 2015.

67 The only area where there may be scope for future comparative impact assessments is the analysis of the strength of the different Congolese army units, which, according to the MONUSCO delivery approach, were trained by different countries.


69 NeST, 2015a, op. cit.

70 Based on interviews with diplomatic and technical officials in Kinshasa in October 2015.

71 Personal interview.
Our co-operation activities mainly revolve around meetings and events; not much happens in-between ... then suddenly a few weeks before the BNC we all are trying to scramble together whatever little information we have on the progress of our various joint projects and commitments.

Some of the monitoring and evaluation challenges stem from the lack of a central development cooperation information hub, which is what SADPA is expected to be. DIRCO has also been challenged a number of times by the Treasury and Parliament on its poor financial management of the ARF, which led in 2013 to the suspension of the Director-General (although he was later reinstated).

Retrieving information on development financing in the DRC is a much more complex and difficult task. In a country notorious for its corruption, patronage system and political divisions, ‘information is power; therefore a culture of secrecy and distrust dominate the Congolese public system’, as reported by several South African development practitioners implementing projects in the DRC. They further stated, ‘the governance challenges, along with the technical capacity limitations, make the exercise of gathering development co-operation information from Congolese authorities a near impossible task.’

Multi-stakeholder participation

This dimension stems from the Nairobi (2009) principle that SSC should be an exercise in broad-based participation rather than token engagement of non-state actors. This manifests itself in platforms for multi-stakeholder dialogues (indicator 14), which are rich in both the number and range of stakeholders, allowing for a consultative environment throughout all stages of the developmental co-operation process. Active engagement in the programme cycle (indicator 15) is operationalised with avenues for participation for non-state actors that are empowering and inclusive. Within the spirit of inclusive partnerships, the expectation is for SSC to protect people and the environment (indicator 16) through its consideration of labour, land and safety regulations in both of the SSC partner countries.

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72 Besharati NA, 2013b, op. cit.
76 Personal interview.
77 Nairobi Outcome document, op. cit.
78 NeST, 2015a, op. cit.
SSC is normally dominated by government-to-government relationships, and this has also been the case in the South Africa–DRC partnership. The South African private sector has also had a significant engagement in the DRC;\(^79\) however, this has been largely independent from the PCRD efforts of the South African government.

Representatives of South African civil society also complain that there are no appropriate structures and systems to allow civic engagement in development co-operation activities.\(^80\) Nonetheless, in the case of the DRC, several South African non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been involved in the implementation of South Africa–DRC peace and development initiatives. These organisations include the Institute for Security Studies, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, South African Women in Dialogue, the Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa, the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa and Pax Africa. One of the key South African NGOs that was at the heart of the security sector reform programme was IDASA. It played an important role in mobilising Congolese civil society to influence police reform in the DRC. Interestingly, Réseau pour la Réforme du Secteur de Sécurité et de Justice, the umbrella organisation established by IDASA to co-ordinate the Congolese civil society organisations engaged in the sector, is still active and strong, while IDASA has closed down because of a lack of funding.

Building on its progressive constitution and its history of reconciliation, peaceful transition and democracy, South Africa has tried to play a role in addressing justice, governance and rule of law in the DRC. It has also made a concerted effort to ensure that the public sphere in the DRC is diverse and representative, particularly in terms of gender parity.\(^81\)

While generally upholding the importance of justice, rule of law and respect for human rights, South Africa’s engagement has not been without its negative elements. UN reports confirmed that in 2013 there were at least 23 cases of rape and sexual assault involving South African National Defence Force soldiers serving in MONUSCO.\(^82\)

\(^{79}\) See Besharati NA & G Mthembu-Salter (forthcoming), op. cit.
Development effectiveness

This dimension refers to the effectiveness of SSC in achieving development results. The first indicator is that SSC should be flexible and adaptable to the local context (indicator 17). Time and cost efficiency (indicator 18) in the delivery of development projects is one of the assumed SSC strengths. Effective SSC requires co-ordination and complementarity among the provider’s internal delivery agencies as well as with external development partners operating in the recipient country (indicator 19). Lastly, policy coherence for development (PCD) (indicator 20) is important, to ensure that the foreign and domestic policies of the SSC provider do not negatively affect other developing countries.

The lessons of the DRC experience are that the outcomes of South Africa’s interventions are mixed and depend on the context and the personality and skills of the project managers (champions), as is the case with all development assistance programmes.

The absence of an institutionalised aid provision system meant that South Africa could be fairly flexible and adaptable to the specific conditions it faced it in the DRC. Owing to its experience with conflict mediation, political transition, poverty and inequality, it could adapt fairly well to the Congolese context and climate, and political, social and economic conditions. Senior Congolese army officials have, for instance, commented in an interview in Kinshasa, ‘We appreciate learning from the “South African military doctrine” … the “black and white” racial nature of South Africa’s technical assistance is a good bridge between the African and the European realities.’

On the other hand, South Africa’s ‘African comparative advantage’ must not be overemphasised, as its limitations in engaging in a French-speaking environment are a serious handicap. Furthermore, the implementation of a public sector reform programme becomes more challenging for South Africans, as the Congolese public system is modelled after the French and Belgian systems rather than the British one.

With regard to cost-efficiency, Gauteng is an important logistics hub for DRC support activities. Many of the experts, materials and services procured by development partners operating in the DRC are more easily available and more quickly deployable from South Africa.

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84 NeST, 2015a, op. cit.
85 Muthayan S, op. cit.
86 Personal interview.
South Africa's logistical advantage is, however, offset by what is considered by many to be the ‘slow and inefficient bureaucracy’ that characterises its development programmes. The ARF (the primary tool of South Africa's development co-operation, jointly managed by DIRCO and the Treasury) suffers from serious operational bottlenecks. South Africa also lacks internal co-ordination among its various departments and agencies, thus making its development interventions fragmented, ad hoc and ineffective. For example, the ENA lobbied for many years for a new building. However, due to bureaucratic delays and poor co-ordination in Pretoria, PALAMA and the Department of Public Works were unable to implement the required renovation work requested by the Congolese government, which ended up being funded instead by the EU and the World Bank in 2011.

When it comes to co-ordination and complementarity with external actors, South Africa is the only SSC partner that attends the ‘international contact group’ meetings, the donor co-ordination meetings in Kinshasa and sector working groups in which it is active. A South African official who attends these meetings explained:

I often feel uneasy and unprepared to be part of the discussions of a group of donor countries with very well-established development agencies, with large pools of financial resources and specialised personnel in many fields, which South Africa is far from matching.

This also resonates with DIRCO’s ideological orientation, which, like other SSC providers, is uncomfortable operating in the DAC-like co-ordination forums and systems established by traditional donors. While Kabila’s government would certainly prefer to deal with South Africa and other donors bilaterally, the international and local development community expects South Africa to act as a bridge between Kinshasa, Northern donors and the other emerging economies.

With regard to indicator 20 (PCD), while South Africa has been promoting a strong foreign policy in favour of African integration, this is sometimes at odds with some of its domestic policies, such as immigration. An estimated 500 000 Congolese migrants (students, doctors, teachers, businesspeople and members of the clergy) are present in South Africa. Movement between the DRC and South Africa is becoming increasingly restricted because of the tightening of visas and permits by the South African authorities. This incoherence has a negative effect on the scope and quality of SSC and regional co-operation. Furthermore, the xenophobic outbreaks in the past few years have seen many Congolese casualties and have been a shock to relations between South Africa and the DRC, as with the rest of the African continent.

87 Besharati NA, 2013b, *op. cit.*
89 Personal interview.
90 Besharati NA, 2013a, *op. cit.*
91 Comments made by a number of diplomats and UN officials interviewed in the course of the fieldwork undertaken in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi in October 2013.
CONCLUSION

This case study on the peace, governance and development partnership between South Africa and the DRC is one of the first pilot studies where the NeST framework and methodology to measure SSC has been tested. It includes a financial analysis of South Africa’s different official development flows to the DRC, as well as a qualitative analysis of the development processes and relationship between the two countries, utilising the SSC dimensions and indicators developed by NeST.

While most of the dimensions of the framework could effectively be assessed at either project or country level, some of the indicators that go beyond the analysis of the bilateral relationship, such as ‘international alliances’ and ‘policy coherence for development’, may need to be incorporated under new dimensions or placed within other analytical instruments used in studies with a broader ambit. The evidence and documentation stemming from SSC is meagre, as SSC still lacks the advanced information management, monitoring and reporting systems that are available to seasoned OECD donors. Basic baseline data to conduct pre- and post-impact evaluations is simply not available.

Nonetheless, the above analysis of SSC between South Africa and the DRC has provided a practical illustration of how the NeST framework can be utilised, contextually adapted and eventually refined for other research cases. This SSC analytical framework also provides a good foundation for the development and strengthening of the M&E and data management systems of SADPA and other Southern development agencies in the making.

The paper has highlighted that the analysis of SSC continues to rely heavily on qualitative methods and interviews with stakeholders, and that the indicators and dimensions proposed by NeST are a useful backdrop against which the quality of South–South partnerships can be assessed. In using qualitative methods, the risks of subjectivity can be neutralised through field-based experiential research, use of triangulation methods and interviews with a variety of stakeholders (government, civil society, private sector, academia, legislators and external actors) on both sides of the development partnership. Through this first field-testing exercise, the draft framework developed by the international technical working group of NeST\(^\text{92}\) was further tightened and polished into the 20 indicators and six dimensions for assessing the quality of SSC, summarised in Table 1. For future case studies a more systematic rating process (ie, 1 to 10) and benchmarking of each indicator should be undertaken to pool results of the various interviews undertaken during the field research.

Quantitative analysis of SSC flows is a useful complement to the research but is more challenging, as it requires an agreed definition on what to include or exclude in the calculation of SSC. Building consensus around a common conceptual framework for SSC

is important in order to allow for consistent reporting, better accountability to domestic and external stakeholders, and comparative analysis between different SSC partners. This study has proposed a working definition for SSC not too distant from the revised ODA and TOSSD definitions currently discussed in the DAC. The definition used in this study has worked in the accounting of South Africa’s development co-operation and can be debated in future SSC forums, such as NeST, where conceptual issues around SSC continue to be discussed.

A SSC definition needs to expand its ambit to include broader interventions in the arena of peace, governance and state building, which are prerequisites for sustainable development. The diverse lending instruments currently offered by development finance institutions in the global South need to be carefully unpacked with regard to concessionality and intent, and the contribution they make to infrastructure and economic development, particularly of the least-developed partner countries. In South Africa’s accounting of its development co-operation a deeper assessment is required of the nature of the development loans provided by the DBSA and IDC to other African countries. Similarly, trade, investment and other activities of the private sector need to be examined to assess the degree to which they contribute to ‘development outcomes’ and ‘public goods’. Monetising technical co-operation, knowledge sharing and other forms of in-kind support remains a challenging exercise in the process of accounting SSC flows, but can benefit from closer collaboration between development finance, statistics and foreign policy experts.

The quantification exercise the study undertook revealed that between 2001 and 2015 South Africa contributed over $1 billion\(^{93}\) in ODA-like co-operation activities in the DRC, peaking at $181 million in 2008, which made South Africa the third biggest development partner to the DRC that year. While South Africa is also a pivotal partner in trilateral co-operation and implementing initiatives by other traditional donors and multilateral organisations, it provides the most substantial contribution to the DRC through bilateral channels. Although focused only on one recipient country, this case study shows that South Africa, as a small middle-income economy, stands shoulder to shoulder not only with the emerging Southern providers but also with the traditional OECD donors active in the African development landscape.

The DRC has been by all accounts the biggest recipient of South African foreign assistance for the past 20 years. Its peace and development challenges remain far from being resolved, and South Africa’s financial prowess and experience in development co-operation is more limited than that of traditional donors. Nonetheless, South Africa brings a unique brand to the international development architecture. As an African developing country it better understands and appreciates local political, economic and cultural realities, and is thus able to more effectively conduct peace-making and governance reform in complex environments such as the DRC. The francophone modus operandi of the Congolese.

\(^{93}\) ZAR 8.5 billion based on the total sum arrived at as seen in the tables in Appendix 1, converted to US dollars based on a weighted average exchange rate for the years in question (calculated at 8.40 ZAR to 1 USD using http://www.usforex.com/forex-tools/historical-rate-tools/yearly-average-rates).
public system, however, does pose practical challenges to South Africa’s intervention. The unstable political situation and high turnover in the DRC civil service also pose major threats to the sustainability of South Africa’s capacity-building efforts. Nonetheless, the Kinshasa government considers Pretoria a trusted, reliable and honest partner, and thus South Africa is an important bridge between the DRC and other African, Southern and Northern countries.

Overall South Africa’s development partnership with the DRC is a good example of SSC, where principles of national ownership, self-reliance, capacity development, respect for sovereignty, trust and demand-driven assistance have been translated from rhetoric into practice. Pretoria’s approach to peace-building and development co-operation is clearly different from that of traditional donors. However, the answer to the question of whether SSC is more effective than NSC in fragile environments is still inconclusive, due to the limited data and lack of credible outcome evaluations of South Africa’s state-building interventions.

While the supposedly horizontal relationship has brought numerous benefits to the DRC, it has not always been clear what South Africa gains from the large investments it has made in the country. Ironically, this particular instance of SSC is more of a win-win in favour of the DRC, while South Africa has probably given more than it has received from the partnership. South Africa is still a young and inexperienced development partner with much to learn from its engagements in international development. It needs to define more clearly its strategic intent and its approach to ‘development diplomacy’ on the continent.

South Africa does not have a coherent, co-ordinated and unified approach to its development co-operation. It provides development aid in a fragmented way through a range of different government departments and agencies, as well as non-state and private actors. Reporting on South African development assistance to other countries is not consistent and M&E systems are extremely weak; thus very little information on South Africa’s SSC is available to policymakers, parliamentarians, researchers and the public at large. This limits accountability to domestic constituents, partners and recipients of foreign assistance. Most importantly, it limits the extent to which South Africa can use its ‘soft power’ in regional and global development platforms.

This case study once again highlights the urgent need to establish and operationalise SADPA, which should address many of the above challenges. In the interim there are a number of options for the government, NeST South Africa and civil society to facilitate greater coherence in South Africa’s current regional development efforts, and strengthen M&E and reporting systems for a more effective South African international development programme.
RESEARCH AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT:

- In this interim pre-SADPA period, close collaboration is required between DIRCO, the Treasury and the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) to facilitate the co-ordination and M&E of South Africa’s development co-operation activities. There should be greater synergy and integration between the development initiatives of the different public entities active in Africa, including co-ordination with South Africa’s civil society and private sector, through a stronger ‘SA Inc.’ approach when engaging with the continent.
- DIRCO should better define its strategic intent, interests, comparative strength and unique approach to its regional and international development endeavours, and systematically and regularly evaluate whether its strategic objectives are being achieved.
- Key South African government agencies (DPME, DIRCO, the Treasury, DBSA) and research organisations (NeST SA) can work together to comprehensively account South Africa’s overall development co-operation on the continent. Making such information publicly available will ensure accountability and transparency in its development co-operation. It will also help to strengthen SADPA’s future policy development.

TO SOUTHERN THINK TANKS AND RESEARCH ORGANISATIONS:

- More empirical case studies of ‘emerging development partners’ should be undertaken to better understand the dynamic features of and approaches to SSC, as well as the contributions that SSC makes to the SDGs and Africa’s Agenda 2063. The NeST methodology, indicators and conceptual framework can be used for such research exercises.
- Consensus within NeST needs to be built on a common definition of SSC that allows for consistent reporting of SSC flows, better comparative analysis between Southern countries, and improved national and international statistics in line with the ‘data revolution’ required for Agenda 2030. This involves unpacking issues of concessionality in South–South loans and the role of trade, investment and public–private partnerships in SSC. The conceptual framework used in this South Africa–DRC case study can provide a useful starting point in the current debates around SSC and TOSSD.
## ENDNOTES

### SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION FLOWS TO THE DRC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding channel</th>
<th>Financial year</th>
<th>Amount spent (ZAR millions)</th>
<th>SSC initiative</th>
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<td>7.5</td>
<td>DRC security project</td>
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<td>DRC census project</td>
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<td>Observer mission</td>
</tr>
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<td>2010–2011</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>Projects</td>
</tr>
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<td>Purchase of riot equipment</td>
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<td>ARF (through SAPS)</td>
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<td>SAPS to purchase riot equipment, DRC</td>
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<td>ARF (through IEC)</td>
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Source: Authors’ compilation from data extracted from ARF Annual Reports 2005–2015
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<td>Development loans</td>
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**TOTAL** | **ZAR 5 billion (rounded off)**

Source: Authors’ compilation from data extracted from Estimates of National Expenditures (ENE), National Treasury 2001–2015
### TABLE A3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Number of Congolese students in SA universities</th>
<th>Total expenditure</th>
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Source: Authors’ compilation from data provided by DHET (Department of Higher Education and Training)
## TABLE A4 TRILATERAL CO-OPERATION MOBILISED THROUGH SOUTH AFRICA FOR THE DRC, 2004–2013

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<th>Donor country</th>
<th>South African ‘intermediary’</th>
<th>Financial years</th>
<th>Amount spent (ZAR million)</th>
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<td>SAPS</td>
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<td>The provision and installation of police communications equipment by South Africa for election security in the DRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
<td>251.0</td>
<td>DRC – destruction of small arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>Integration of armed force in the DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>DIRCO, Pax Africa</td>
<td>2011–2013</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>Development of a PCRD strategy for South Africa’s involvement in the DRC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** | **ZAR 630 million (rounded off)**

Source: Authors’ compilation from data extracted from National Treasury, Review of Trilateral Co-operation Activities of South Africa, 2015
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